2G1305 Internetworking/Internetteknik
Spring 2005, Period 4

Module 6: SCTP

KTH Information and Communication Technology

Lecture notes of G. Q. Maguire Jr.

For use in conjunction with *TCP/IP Protocol Suite*, by Behrouz A. Forouzan, 3rd Edition, McGraw-Hill.

For this lecture: Chapter 13

Last modified: 2005.04.27:19:34

Transport layer protocols

- User Datagram Protcol (UDP)
  - Connectionless unreliable service
- Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)
  - Connection-oriented reliable stream service
- Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) <<< today's topic
  - Reliable message oriented service - a modern transmission protocol

Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) [26]

Provides a reliable message-oriented service; combining best of TCP & UDP.

- SCTP utilizes full-duplex associations
- SCTP applications write messages to one of several streams and read messages from these streams
  - each unit is a **chunk**
  - here are record makers ⇒ the receiver **can** tell how much the sender wrote into the stream at any given time
  - multiple streams prevents a loss on one stream from affecting other streams
- SCTP supports multihoming
  - the sender and receiver can utilize multiple interfaces with multiple IP addresses ⇒ increased fault tolerance
  - current implementations do **not** support *load balancing* (i.e., only supports failover)
- SCTP provides reliability
  - via acknowledgements, timeouts, retransmission, …
- SCTP provides flow control
- SCTP tries to avoid causing congestion

SCTP Applications

- Initial goal of IETF Sigtran WG was to support SS7 applications over IP
  - For example, SMS transfer!
  - For an example see [24], [28]
- new applications being developed to use SCTP
  - SIP over SCTP
  - HTTP over SCTP
  - recommended transport protocol for DIAMETER
- Strong security can be provided via TLS [35]

SCTP Header



Figure 38: SCTP packet (see Forouzan figure 13.4 pg. 350)

IP protocol x84 = SCTP

- General Header
  - As with UDP & TCP, SCTP provides de/multiplexing via the 16 bit source and destination ports.
  - Associations between end points are defined by a unique **verification tag**
    - A separate verification tag is used in each direction
  - SCTP applies a CRC-32 end-to-end checksum to its general header and all the chunks
    - Previously it used Adler-32 checksum [34]
- Chunks
  - Control information is contained in Control Chunks (these always **precede** any data chunks)
  - Multiple data chunks can be present - each containing data for different streams

SCTP Chunk



Figure 39: SCTP packet (see Forouzan figure 13.8 pg. 354)

- Type

Type	Chunk	Description	Type	Chunk	Description
0	DATA	User data	7	SHUTDOWN	Terminate an association
1	INIT	Setup an association	8	SHUTDOWN-ACK	Acknowledge SHUTDOWN chunk
2	INIT-ACK	Acknowledge an INIT chunk	9	ERROR	Reports errors without shutting down
3	SACK	Selective Acknowledgement	10	COOKIE ECHO	Third packet in establishment of an association
4	HEARTBEAT	Probe to see if peer is alive	11	COOKIE ACK	Acknowledges COOKIE ECHO chunk
5	HEARTBEAT-ACK	Acknowledgement of a HEARTBEAT chunk	14	SHUTDOWN COMPLETE	Third packet in an association terminations
6	ABORT	Abort an association	192	FORWARD TSN	To adjust the cumulative TSN

- Flag - 8 bit field defined per chunk type
- Length - 16 bit length of chunk including chunk header (i.e., smallest value is 4) - does **not** include any padding bytes (hence you know just how much padding there is)

Association establishment - 4-way handshake



See Forouzan figure 13.19 page 363

The entity initiating the connection is (normally) called the "client" and does an active open, where as the server needed to previous do a passive open.

INIT Chunk



Figure 40: SCTP INIT chunk (see Forouzan figure 13.10 pg. 357)

- Initiation tag
  - defines the tags for this association to be used by the other party
  - reduce the risk due to a blind attacker (since there is only a 1 in 2^{32} chance of guessing the right tag)
  - can reject delayed packets - thus avoiding the need for TCP's TIME-WAIT timer
- Advertised receiver window credit
  - defines rwnd (i.e., how much the receiver can send to this party)
- Outbound streams
  - suggested upper number of streams **from** this sender (can be reduced by receiver)
- Maximum inbound streams
  - upper limit of streams **to** this sender

- Transmission sequence number (TSN)
  - Initializes the TSN in the outbound direction, initialized to a random value
- Variable-length parameters
  - IP address(es) of endpoint
    - Multiple addresses are used to support multihoming
    - The **receiver** selects the primary address for the other endpoint
  - Type of addresses
  - Support for Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN)
  - …

INIT ACK Chunk



Figure 41: SCTP INIT ACK chunk (see Forouzan figure 13.11 pg. 358)

The same fields as in the INIT chunk (with Initiation tag value set to that of the INIT) - but with the addition of a required parameter with a state cookie.

- Parameter type: 7 = State Cookie
- Parameter length = size of State Cookie + 4 (the parameter type and length fields)

A packet carrying this INIT ACK chunk can not contain any other control or data chunks.

State Cookie

Use of the COOKIE prevents a SYN flood like attack - since resources are not allocated until the COOKIE ECHO chuck is received.

However, state has to be saved from the initial INIT chunk - therefore it is placed in the cookie in a way that only the server can access it (hence the cookie is sealed with an HMAC {aka digest} after being created {aka “baked”}). This requires that the server has a secret key which it uses to compute this digest.

If the sender of the INIT is an attacker located on another machine, they won’t be able to receive the cookie if they faked the source address in the INIT - since the INIT ACK is sent to the address and contains the cookie!

- Without a cookie ⇒ no association is created and no resources (such as TCB) are tied up!

COOKIE ECHO Chunk



Figure 42: SCTP COOKIE ECHO chunk (see Forouzan figure 13.12 pg. 359)

- (chunk) Type: 10 = COOKIE ECHO
- (chunk) length = size of State Cookie + 4 (the parameter type and length fields)
- State Cookie
  - simply a copy of the COOKIE data from the INIT ACK chunk
  - The COOKIE data is opaque (i.e., only the sender can read the cookie)

A packet carrying this COOKIE ECHO chunk can contain other control or data chunks -- in particular it can care the first user (client) data!

COOKIE ACK Chunk



Figure 43: SCTP COOKIE ACK chunk (see Forouzan figure 13.13 pg. 359)

Completes the 4 way handshake.

A packet with this chunk can also carry control and data chunks (in particular the first of the user (server) data.

Data Chunk



Figure 44: SCTP Data Chunk (see Forouzan figure 13.9 pg. 356)

- Flags:
  - U - Unordered - for delivery to the application right away
  - B - Beginning (chunk position - for use with fragmentation)
  - E - End chunk
- Transmission sequence number (TSN)- only data chunks consume TSNs
- Stream identifier (SI)
- Stream Sequence number (SSN)
- Protocol Identifier
- User data
  - at least 1 byte of user data; padded to 32 bit boundaries
  - although a message can be spread over multiple chunks, each chunk contains data from **only** a single message (like UDP, each message results in one or more data SCTP chunks)

Multiple-Streams



Figure 45: Multiple-streams (see Forouzan figure 13.2 pg. 347)

The figure above shows a **single** association.

Each stream has a unique stream identifier (SI) and maintains its own stream sequence number (SSN).

Unordered data chunks (i.e., with U = 0) - do **not** consume a SSN and are delivered when they arrive at the destination.

Multiple streams and unordered data avoid TCP's head of line blocking.

Selective Acknowledgement (SACK) Chunk

0 – 7	8 – 15	16 – 23	24 – 31
Type = 3	Flag = 0	Length	
cumulative TSN acknowledgement			
Advertised receiver window credit			
Number of gap ACK blocks: N		Number of duplicates: M	
Gap ACK block #1 start TSN offset		Gap ACK block #1 end TSN offset	
…		…	
Gap ACK block #N start TSN offset		Gap ACK block #N end TSN offset	
Duplicate TSN 1			
…			
Duplicate TSN M			

Figure 46: SCTP Data Chunk (see Forouzan figure 13.9 pg. 356)

- Cumulative Transmission sequence number (TSN) acknowledgement - the last data chunk received **in sequence**
- Gap = received sequence of chunks (indicated with start .. end TSNs)
- Duplicate TSN - indicating duplicate chunks (if any)
- SACK always sent to the IP address where the corresponding packet originated

ERROR chunk

Sent when an endpoint finds some error in a packet



Figure 47: SCTP ERROR chunk (see Forouzan figure 13.17 pg. 361)

Error code	Description
1	Invalid Stream identifier
2	Missing mandatory parameter
3	State cookie error
4	Out of resource
5	Unresolvable address
6	Unrecognized chunk type
7	Invalid mandatory parameters
8	Unrecognized parameter
9	No user data
10	Cookie received while shutting down

Association Termination

Two forms of termination

- Association Abort
  - Used in the event of a fatal error
  - uses same error codes as the ERROR Chunk
  - Chunk format



Figure 48: SCTP ABORT chunk (see Forouzan figure 13.18 pg. 362)

- Association Shutdown - graceful termination

Association Shutdown



Figure 49: Adapted from Forouzan figure 13.21 page 368 and slide 15 of [25]



Figure 50: SCTP SHUTDOWN chunk (see Forouzan figure 13.16 pg. 361)



Figure 51: SCTP SHUTDOWN ACK chunk (see Forouzan figure 13.16 pg. 361)



Figure 52: SCTP SHUTDOWN COMPLETE chunk (see Forouzan figure 13.16 pg. 361)

- T bit indicates the sender did **not** have a Transmission Control Block (TCB)

SCTP Example - Daytime [29]

```
server# ./daytime_server -s 192.168.1.2 -vv
1       : Communication up (1 paths)
1       : Network status change: path 0 is now REACHABLE
1       : Shutdown complete

client# ./terminal -vv -r 13 -d 192.168.1.2 -s 192.168.1.1
1       : Communication up (1 paths, 1 In-Streams, 1 Out-Streams)
1       : Network status change: path 0 (towards 192.168.1.2) is now REACHABLE
Wed Apr 27 11:52:04 2005
1       : Shutdown received
```

```
11 74.864232 192.168.1.1    192.168.1.2    SCTP    INIT
12 74.864552 192.168.1.2    192.168.1.1    SCTP    INIT_ACK
13 74.864808 192.168.1.1    192.168.1.2    SCTP    COOKIE_ECHO
14 74.865073 192.168.1.2    192.168.1.1    SCTP    COOKIE_ACK
15 74.865273 192.168.1.2    192.168.1.1    SCTP    DATA
16 74.865733 192.168.1.1    192.168.1.2    SCTP    SACK
17 74.865933 192.168.1.2    192.168.1.1    SCTP    SHUTDOWN
18 74.866132 192.168.1.1    192.168.1.2    SCTP    SHUTDOWN_ACK
19 74.866195 192.168.1.2    192.168.1.1    SCTP    SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE
```

Figure 53: SCTP Daytime example - output from Ethereal

ethereal capture - daytime - INIT

```
Frame 11 …
Stream Control Transmission Protocol
    Source port: 10777
    Destination port: 13
    Verification tag: 0x00000000
    Checksum: 0x2b84fdb0[1]
    INIT chunk (Outbound streams: 10, inbound streams: 10)
        Chunk type: INIT (1)
        Chunk flags: 0x00
        Chunk length: 32
        Initiate tag: 0x43d82c5d
        Advertised receiver window credit (a_rwnd): 131071
        Number of outbound streams: 10
        Number of inbound streams: 10
        Initial TSN: 771212194
        Forward TSN supported parameter
            Parameter type: Forward TSN supported (0xc000)
…               Parameter length: 4
        Supported address types parameter (Supported types: IPv4)
            Parameter type: Supported address types (0x000c)
            Parameter length: 6
            Supported address type: IPv4 address (5)
```

1. Ethereal complains about this checksum saying “(incorrect Adler32, should be 0x973b078d)”, but this is in error see [34].

ethereal capture - daytime - INIT-ACK

```
Frame 12 … Stream Control Transmission Protocol
      Source port: 13
      Destination port: 10777
      Verification tag: 0x43d82c5d
      Checksum: 0x7f61f237
      INIT_ACK chunk (Outbound streams: 1, inbound streams: 1)
          Chunk type: INIT_ACK (2)
          Chunk flags: 0x00
          Chunk length: 128
          Initiate tag: 0x5d581d9a
          Advertised receiver window credit (a_rwnd): 131071
          Number of outbound streams: 1
          Number of inbound streams: 1
          Initial TSN: 1514529259
          State cookie parameter (Cookie length: 100 bytes)
              Parameter type: State cookie (0x0007)
                 Parameter length: 104
              State cookie: 5D581D9A0001FFFF000100015A45E1EB...
          Forward TSN supported parameter
              Parameter type: Forward TSN supported (0xc000)
                  1... .... .... .... = Bit: Skip parameter and con-
tinue prosessing of the chunk
                  .1.. .... .... .... = Bit: Do report
              Parameter length: 4
```

ethereal capture - daytime - COOKIE-ECHO

```
Frame 13 …
    Source port: 10777
    Destination port: 13
    Verification tag: 0x5d581d9a
    Checksum: 0x3af3f579
    COOKIE_ECHO chunk (Cookie length: 100 bytes)
        Chunk type: COOKIE_ECHO (10)
            0... .... = Bit: Stop processing of the packet
            .0.. .... = Bit: Do not report
        Chunk flags: 0x00
        Chunk length: 104
        Cookie: 5D581D9A0001FFFF000100015A45E1EB...
```

ethereal capture - daytime - COOKIE-ACK

```
Frame 14 …
    Source port: 13
    Destination port: 10777
    Verification tag: 0x43d82c5d
    Checksum: 0x762d80d7
    COOKIE_ACK chunk
        Chunk type: COOKIE_ACK (11)
        Chunk flags: 0x00
        Chunk length: 4
```

ethereal capture - daytime - DATA

```
Frame 15 …
    Source port: 13
    Destination port: 10777
    Verification tag: 0x43d82c5d
    Checksum: 0xf8fb1754
    DATA chunk(ordered, complete segment, TSN: 1514529259, SID: 0,
SSN: 0, PPID: 0, payload length: 25 bytes)
        Chunk type: DATA (0)
        Chunk flags: 0x03
            .... ...1 = E-Bit: Last segment
            .... ..1. = B-Bit: First segment
            .... .0.. = U-Bit: Ordered deliviery
        Chunk length: 41
        TSN: 1514529259
        Stream Identifier: 0x0000
        Stream sequence number: 0
        Payload protocol identifier: not specified (0)
        Chunk padding: 000000
Data (25 bytes)
0000  57 65 64 20 41 70 72 20 32 37 20 31 31 3a 34 33   Wed Apr 27 11:43
0010  3a 32 32 20 32 30 30 35 0a                        :22 2005.
```

ethereal capture - daytime - SACK

```
Frame 16 …
     Source port: 10777
     Destination port: 13
     Verification tag: 0x5d581d9a
     Checksum: 0xfa994e35
    SACK chunk (Cumulative TSN: 1514529259, a_rwnd: 131071, gaps: 0,
duplicate TSNs: 0)
          Chunk type: SACK (3)
          Chunk flags: 0x00
          Chunk length: 16
          Cumulative TSN ACK: 1514529259
          Advertised receiver window credit (a_rwnd): 131071
          Number of gap acknowldgement blocks : 0
          Number of duplicated TSNs: 0
```

ethereal capture - daytime - SHUTDOWN

```
Frame 17 …
      Source port: 13
      Destination port: 10777
      Verification tag: 0x43d82c5d
      Checksum: 0xf447d00f
      SHUTDOWN chunk (Cumulative TSN ack: 771212193)
          Chunk type: SHUTDOWN (7)
          Chunk flags: 0x00
          Chunk length: 8
          Cumulative TSN Ack: 771212193
```

ethereal capture - daytime - SHUTDOWN_ACK

```
Frame 18
    Source port: 10777
    Destination port: 13
    Verification tag: 0x5d581d9a
    Checksum: 0x9f44d056
    SHUTDOWN_ACK chunk
        Chunk type: SHUTDOWN_ACK (8)
        Chunk flags: 0x00
        Chunk length: 4
```

ethereal capture - daytime - SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE

```
Frame 19…
    Source port: 13
    Destination port: 10777
    Verification tag: 0x43d82c5d
    Checksum: 0x3db6e771
    SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE chunk
        Chunk type: SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE (14)
        Chunk flags: 0x00
            .... ...0 = T-Bit: TCB destroyed
        Chunk length: 4
```

Fault Management

- Endpoint Failure Detection
  - Endpoint keeps a counter of the total number of consecutive retransmissions to its peer (including retransmissions to all the destination transport addresses [= port + IP address] of the peer if it is multi-homed). When this counter exceeds 'Association.Max.Retrans', the endpoint will consider the peer endpoint unreachable and shall stop transmitting any more data to it (the association enters the CLOSED state).
  - Counter is reset each time:
    - a DATA chunk sent to that peer is acknowledged (by the reception of a SACK) or
    - a HEARTBEAT-ACK is received from the peer
- Path Failure Detection
  - Each time (1) T3-rtx timer expires on any address or (2) a HEARTBEAT sent to an idle address is not acknowledged within a RTO, then the error counter of that destination will be incremented. When this error counter exceeds 'Path.Max.Retrans' for that destination address, then the endpoint marks the destination transport address as inactive and notifies the upper layer.
  - the endpoint clears the error counter of this destination transport address when:
    - an outstanding TSN is acknowledged or
    - a HEARTBEAT address is acknowledged
  - When the primary path is marked inactive, then the sender **may** automatically transmit new packets to an alternate destination address if one exists and is active
    - If more than one alternate address is active ⇒ only **one** transport address is chosen as the new destination transport address.

HEARTBEAT and HEARTBEAT ACK Chunks



Figure 54: SCTP HEARTBEAT and HEARTBEAK ACK chunks (see Forouzan figure 13.15 pg. 360)

- (chunk) Type: 4 = HEARTBEAT
- (chunk) Type: 5 = HEARTBEAT ACK
- (chunk) length = size of sender specific information + 4 (the parameter type and length fields)
- Sender specific information
  - The sender puts its Local time and transport address in (note that the sctplib implementation 1.0.2 puts the time in as an unsigned 32 bit integer and puts the path index in (also as an unsigned 32 bit integer) and add a HMAC computed over these values [29]
  - The acknowledgement simply contains a copy of this information

Heartbeats every ~30 seconds.

Heartbeat and ACK

```
Frame x …
    Source port: 9
    Destination port: 38763
    Verification tag: 0x36fab554
Checksum: 0x0e6c8d88 (incorrect Adler32, should be 0xf5340ec5)
    HEARTBEAT chunk (Information: 28 bytes)
        Chunk type: HEARTBEAT (4)
        Chunk flags: 0x00
        Chunk length: 32
        Heartbeat info parameter (Information: 24 bytes)
            Parameter type: Heartbeat info (0x0001)
            Parameter length: 28
            Heartbeat information: 0280351E00000000E1A06CFBC1C6933F...
    Source port: 38763
    Destination port: 9
    Verification tag: 0x57c3a50c
Checksum: 0xaa2fba80 (incorrect Adler32, should be 0xe7450e58)
    HEARTBEAT_ACK chunk (Information: 28 bytes)
        Chunk type: HEARTBEAT_ACK (5)
        Chunk flags: 0x00
        Chunk length: 32
        Heartbeat info parameter (Information: 24 bytes)
            Parameter type: Heartbeat info (0x0001)
            Parameter length: 28
            Heartbeat information: 0280351E00000000E1A06CFBC1C6933F...
```

Differences from TCP Congestion Control

- Any DATA chunk that has been acknowledged by SACK, including DATA that arrived out of order, are **only** considered fully delivered when the Cumulative TSN Ack Point passes the TSN of the DATA chunk

⇒ cwnd controls the amount of outstanding data, rather than (as in the case of non-SACK TCP) the upper bound between the highest acknowledged sequence number and the latest DATA chunk that can be sent within the congestion window

⇒ different fast-retransmit & fast-recovery than non-SACK TCP

- Retransmission based on both retransmission timer (with an RTO per path)
- Three SACKS (i.e., 4 consecutive duplicate SACKs indicating missing chunks) fi immediate retransmission of these missing chunks

Sender

- uses the same destination address until instructed by the upper layer (however, SCTP may change to an alternate destination in the event an address is marked inactive) ⇒ retransmission can be to a different transport address than the original transmission.
- keeps separate congestion control parameters (cwnd, ssthresh, and partial_bytes_acked) for each of the destination addresses it can send to (i.e., not each source-destination pair)
  - these parameters should decay if the address is not used
  - does slow-start upon the first transmission to each of destination addresses

Path MTU Discovery

- IPv4
  - Based on RFC 1191 [31] each endpoint maintains an estimate of the maximum transmission unit (MTU) along a **each** path and refrains from sending packets along that path which exceed the MTU, other than occasional attempts to probe for a change in the Path MTU (PMTU).
- IPv6
  - Based on RFC1981 [32] an SCTP sender using IPv6 **must** use Path MTU Discovery, unless all packets are less than the minimum IPv6 MTU (see RFC 2460 [33]).

SCTP differs in several ways from the description in RFC 1191 of applying MTU discovery to TCP:

1 SCTP associations can span multiple addresses $\Rightarrow$ an endpoint does PMTU discovery on a per-destination-address basis
  - The term “MTU” always refers to the MTU associated with the destination address

2 Since SCTP does not have a notion of “Maximum Segment Size”, for each destination $MTU_{initial} \leq MTU_{link}$ for the local interface to which packets for that remote destination address will be routed

3 When retransmitting to a remote address for which the IP datagram appears too large for the path MTU to that address, the IP datagram **should** be retransmitted without the DF bit set, enabling it to be fragmented. While *initial* transmissions of IP datagrams **must** have DF set.

4 Sender maintains an association PMTU (= smallest PMTU discovered for all of the peer's destination addresses); when fragmenting messages this association PMTU is used to calculate the size of each fragment ⇒ retransmissions can sent to an alternate address without encountering IP fragmentation

SCTP header continued

- **Reliability** is provided by a 32 bit SCTP sequence numbers (TSN)
  - The initial sequence number is a random 32 bit number
  - These sequence numbers are in the header of individual chunks
  - This cumulative number is used to provide both flow control and error control
- SCTP resequences data at the receiving side
- SCTP discards duplicate data at the receiving side

The window size (or more exactly the receive window size (rwnd)) - indicates how many bytes the receiver is prepared to receive (this number is relative to the acknowledgement number).

Forward Cumulative TSN

Allows an endpoint to signal to its peer that it should move the cumulative acknowledgement forward [30]. This protocol extension adds a new parameter (Forward-TSN-Supported) to INIT and INIT ACK, and a new FORWARD TSN chunk type. It provides an example of a partially reliable service.



Figure 55: SCTP FORWARD TSN Chunk (see [30])

- $Stream_i$ a stream number that was skipped by this FWD-TSN.
- $Stream\ Sequence_i$ = the largest stream sequence number in $stream_i$ being skipped
- Receiver can use the $Stream_i$ and $Stream\ Sequence_i$ fields to enable delivery of (stranded) TSN's that remain in the stream re-ordering queues.

SCTP Performance

See the upcoming exjobb report by Mia Immonen.

Transport Protocol Functional Overview

From table 1-1 of [27] on page 12; also appears in [36]

Protocol Feature	SCTP	TCP	UDP
State required at each endpoint	Yes	Yes	No
Reliable data transfer	Yes	Yes	No
Congest control and avoidance	Yes	Yes	No
Message boundary conservation	Yes	No	Yes
Path MTU discovery and message fragmentation	Yes	Yes	No
Message bundling	Yes	Yes	No
Multi-homed hosts support	Yes	No	No
Multi-stream support	Yes	No	No
Unordered data delivery	Yes	No	Yes
Security cookie against SYN flood attack	Yes	No	No
Built-in heartbeat (readability check)	Yes	No	No

Summary

This lecture we have discussed:

- SCTP
  - Message framing
  - Multi-homing
  - Multi-streaming
- How SCTP differs from TCP
- Measurements of an implementation (there are other implementations such as that included with [27]):
  - *http://www.sctp.de*
  - *http://www.sctp.org*
  - Linux Kernel SCTP *http://sourceforge.net/projects/lksctp*

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