Modular Verification of Temporal Safety Properties of Procedural Programs

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SEFM 2011 Tutorial, Montevideo, 15 November 2011

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15 November 2011 1 / 41

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 Modular verification of temporal properties: Grumberg & Long 1994: finite-state systems, ACTL Kupferman & Vardi 2000: finite-state systems, ACTL* based on maximal model construction

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- Modular verification of temporal properties: Grumberg & Long 1994: finite-state systems, ACTL Kupferman & Vardi 2000: finite-state systems, ACTL* based on maximal model construction
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- Modular verification of procedural programs: "built-in" for Hoare-logic based approaches
- Model checking procedural programs: Das, Lerner & Seigl 2002: property simulation (ESP) Esparza et al 2002: model checking pushdown systems

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This work

- started in 2001
- original goal: verify Javacard programs in the presence of post-issuance loading of applets on smart cards
- joint work with Marieke Huisman, Christoph Sprenger, Irem Aktug, Siavash Soleimanifard, Afshin Amighi, Pedro Gomez

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Compositionality and Modularity

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15 November 2011 4 / 41

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Compositionality and Modularity

Compositionality as a *mathematical principle*:

- express the meaning of the whole through the meaning of the parts
- example: denotational semantics
- example: definitions and proofs by structural induction

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- express the meaning of the whole through the meaning of the parts
- example: denotational semantics
- example: definitions and proofs by structural induction

Modularity as a systems design principle:

control the complexity of the system
 by braking it down into manageable pieces that are
 designed, implemented, tested and maintained *independently*

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Verification

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Verification

Verification as a systems design task:

• match a model of the system against a specification

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Verification as a *systems design task*:

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Modular Verification:

- specify and verify every module independently
- infer system correctness from module correctness

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This relativization allows verification in the presence of variability

Variability

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Temporal variability:

- static code evolution
- dynamic code replacement
- dynamic code loading: code not available at verification time

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- static code evolution
- dynamic code replacement
- dynamic code loading: code not available at verification time

Spacial variablility:

• multiple variants, as arising from software product lines

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Consider a system with four modules (components):

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• A implemented, stable

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Consider a system with four modules (components):

- A implemented, stable
- B implemented, expected to evolve

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Consider a system with four modules (components):

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- *D* not yet implemented/available

How shall one plan for the verification of a global property $\psi?$

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How shall one plan for the verification of a global property ψ ?

as early as possible

Consider a system with four modules (components):

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How shall one plan for the verification of a global property $\psi?$

- as early as possible
- with minimal effort: reuse results

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15 November 2011 8 / 41

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Relativize global property on local specifications. Three tasks:

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specify modules B, C, D

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2 verify

 $impl(B) \models spec(B)$ $impl(C) \models spec(C)$ $impl(D) \models spec(D)$

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specify modules B, C, D

verify

$$impl(B) \models spec(B)$$

 $impl(C) \models spec(C)$
 $impl(D) \models spec(D)$

$$impl(A) + spec(B) + spec(C) + spec(D) \models \psi$$

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But... how, and is there an algorithmic solution?

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perform the following steps:

- Irom module implementations: extract models
- Ø model check models against local specifications:

```
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mod(impl(C)) \models spec(C)
mod(impl(D)) \models spec(D)
```

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- If from module implementations: extract models
- If from module specifications: construct (so-called maximal) models
- Scompose extracted with constructed models

$$impl(A) + spec(B) + spec(C) + spec(D) \models \psi$$

perform the following steps:

- Ifrom module implementations: extract models
- Irom module specifications: construct (so-called maximal) models
- Sompose extracted with constructed models
- model check composed model against global property ψ: mod(impl(A)) + max(spec(B)) + max(spec(C)) + max(spec(D)) ⊨ ψ

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We require the following conditions:

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We require the following conditions:

extracted models simulate module implementations

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We require the following conditions:

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The third task:

 $mod(impl(A)) + max(spec(B)) + max(spec(C)) + max(spec(D)) \models \psi$

thus entails:

$$impl(A) + impl(B) + impl(C) + impl(D) \models \psi$$

Program model: Flow graphs capturing purely control flow

• behaviour as induced pushdown automaton

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Program model: Flow graphs capturing purely control flow

• behaviour as induced pushdown automaton

Properties: legal sequences of method invocations

• temporal safety properties

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Program model: Flow graphs capturing purely control flow

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Verification: pushdown automata model checking

• essentially a language inclusion problem

Program model: Flow graphs capturing purely control flow

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Properties: legal sequences of method invocations

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Verification: pushdown automata model checking

• essentially a language inclusion problem

Most details in:

Compositional Verification of Sequential Programs with Procedures Dilian Gurov, Marieke Huisman and Christoph Sprenger Journal of Information and Computation vol. 206, no. 7, pp. 840–868, 2008

Tutorial Outline


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Tutorial Outline

- Preliminaries: Models, Simulation, Logic
- I Flow Graphs, Behaviour and Extraction
- Property Specification and Verification
- Maximal Flow Graphs
- Tool Support
- O Application: Software Product Lines
- Onclusion

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
A model \mathcal{M}



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Definition (Model)

A structure $\mathcal{M} = (S, L, \rightarrow, A, \lambda)$ where:


- (i) S a set of states
- (ii) L a set of transition labels

(iii) $\rightarrow \subseteq S \times L \times S$ a transition relation

(iv) A a set of atomic propositions

(v) $\lambda: S \to \mathcal{P}(A)$ a valuation

A model \mathcal{M}



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An intialised model (\mathcal{M}, E) is a model \mathcal{M} with a designated set of entry states $E \subseteq S$

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Let $\mathcal{M}_1 = (S_1, L, \rightarrow_1, A, \lambda_1)$ and $\mathcal{M}_2 = (S_2, L, \rightarrow_2, A, \lambda_2)$ be models over the same sets of labels and atomic propositions.

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Definition (Simulation)

A binary relation R ⊆ S₁ × S₂ is a simulation if whenever (s₁, s₂) ∈ R
(i) λ₁(s₁) = λ₂(s₂)
(ii) for any a ∈ L and s'₁ ∈ S₁ s₁ →₁ s'₁ entails s₂ →₂ s'₂ for some s'₂ ∈ S₂ such that (s'₁, s'₂) ∈ R

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s₂ ∈ S₂ simulates s₁ ∈ S₁ if there is a simulation relation R so that (s₁, s₂) ∈ R

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 s₂ ∈ S₂ simulates s₁ ∈ S₁ if there is a simulation relation R so that (s₁, s₂) ∈ R
- (*M*₂, *E*₂) simulates (*M*₁, *E*₁) if every s₁ ∈ *E*₁ is simulated by some s₂ ∈ *E*₂

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Definition (Simulation Logic)

The formulas of the logic are inductively defined through the BNF:

$$\phi ::= p \mid \neg p \mid X \mid \phi_1 \land \phi_2 \mid \phi_1 \lor \phi_2 \mid [a] \phi \mid \nu X.\phi$$

where $p \in A$ and $a \in L$

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Example

Some example formulas and their meaning:

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$$\phi ::= p \mid \neg p \mid X \mid \phi_1 \land \phi_2 \mid \phi_1 \lor \phi_2 \mid [a] \phi \mid \nu X.\phi$$

where $p \in A$ and $a \in L$

Example

Some example formulas and their meaning:

- [*a*] ff ∧ [*b*] ff
- $[a] ff \vee [b] ff$

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- $\nu X. p \wedge [a] \text{ ff } \wedge [b] X$

Maximal Models

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A maximal model for a formula ϕ is an initialized model S such that:

- (i) S satisfies ϕ
- (si) S simulates all initialized models satisfying ϕ

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Corollary

Maximal models are unique up to simulation equivalence

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Labels $\{a, b\}$, atoms $\{p\}$, formula [b] ff $\land p$

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The formula as an *equation system*:

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convert into simulation normal form:

$$\begin{array}{lll} X & = & \left[a\right]\left(Y_1 \lor Y_2\right) \land \left[b\right] \, \mathrm{ff} \land p \\ Y_1 & = & \left[a\right]\left(Y_1 \lor Y_2\right) \land \left[b\right]\left(Y_1 \lor Y_2\right) \land p \\ Y_2 & = & \left[a\right]\left(Y_1 \lor Y_2\right) \land \left[b\right]\left(Y_1 \lor Y_2\right) \land \neg p \end{array}$$

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
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
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
2. Flow Graphs, Interfaces and Behaviour

Flow Graphs: The structure of program control flow (as a model)



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Flow Graphs: The structure of program control flow (as a model)



Interfaces: provided and required methods

Dilian Gurov (KTH)

A flow graph induces a *pushdown automaton* (PDA):

- configurations (v, σ) are pairs of control point and call stack
- productions induced by:
 - non-call edges: stack unchanged, rewrite control point
 - call edges: push target node on stack, new control point is entry node of called method
 - return nodes: pop stack, new control point is old top of stack


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The behaviour of a flow graph is the behaviour of the induced PDA (again a model)


Flow Graph:



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
Flow Graph:



Example run through the behaviour, from an initial configuration: (v_0,ε)

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Flow Graph:




Example run through the behaviour, from an initial configuration: $(v_0, \varepsilon) \xrightarrow{\tau} (v_1, \varepsilon)$

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Flow Graph:




Example run through the behaviour, from an initial configuration: $(v_0, \varepsilon) \xrightarrow{\tau} (v_1, \varepsilon) \xrightarrow{\tau} (v_2, \varepsilon)$

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
Flow Graph:



Example run through the behaviour, from an initial configuration: $(v_0, \varepsilon) \xrightarrow{\tau} (v_1, \varepsilon) \xrightarrow{\tau} (v_2, \varepsilon) \xrightarrow{\text{even call odd}} (v_5, v_3)$


15 November 2011 21 / 41

Flow Graph:



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
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15 November 2011 21 / 41

Flow Graph:



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Open Flow Graph Behaviour

How to treat external methods in open flow graphs?

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How to treat external methods in open flow graphs?

One possibility is to treat calls to external methods as atomic

- ignores callback behaviour
- not relevant in a context-free setting (no data)

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How to treat external methods in open flow graphs?

One possibility is to treat calls to external methods as atomic

- ignores callback behaviour
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Example run of method even as an open flow graph:

$$(v_0,\varepsilon) \xrightarrow{\tau} (v_1,\varepsilon) \xrightarrow{\tau} (v_2,\varepsilon) \xrightarrow{\text{even caret odd}} (v_3,\varepsilon)$$

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15 November 2011 23

23 / 41

Conceptually simple:

- labels become control points
- instructions define outgoing edges

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Conceptually simple:

- labels become control points
- instructions define outgoing edges

Complications: sound, precise, modular

- virtual method call resolution
- exceptional flow

Java program:

```
public static void Meth(boolean flag, ExtA myobj) {
   try {
        if (flag) myobj.Meth();
        } catch (NullPointerException e) {}
}
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Corresponding bytecode:

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public static void Meth(boolean, ExtA);
Code:
0: iload 1
1: ifeq
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4: aload_0
5: invokevirtual
8: goto
          12
11: astore_2
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Exception table:
from
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
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Correctness:

• stated in terms of simulation

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Tool support:

- SAWJA: a framework for static analysis of Java bytecode
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Details in:

Provably Correct Flow Graphs from Java Programs with Exceptions Afshin Amighi, Pedro de Carvalho Gomez and Marieke Huisman In Proceedings of FoVeOOS'11, pp. 31–48

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Public Interface Abstraction


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
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Details in:

Interface Abstraction for Compositional Verification Dilian Gurov and Marieke Huisman In Proceedings of SEFM'05, pp. 414–423

3. Property Specification and Verification

We instantiate both simulation and simulation logic to flow graphs and flow graph behaviour

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Example structural property:

program is tail recursive:

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```

• can be checked with standard finite-state model checking

Example behavioural property:

• first call of even is not to itself:

even $\Rightarrow \nu X$. [even call even] ff $\wedge [\tau] X$

• can be checked with PDA model checking

More behavioural properties

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• A security policy: "no send after read"

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• A security policy: "no send after read" Interface: provided a, required read, send

 A security policy: "no send after read" Interface: provided a, required read, send Behavioural specification:

$$\begin{split} \phi &= \nu X. \ [\tau] \, X \wedge [\texttt{a caret send}] \, X \wedge [\texttt{a call a}] \, X \wedge [\texttt{a ret a}] \, X \wedge [\texttt{a caret read}] \, \phi' \\ \phi' &= \nu Y. \ [\tau] \, Y \wedge [\texttt{a caret read}] \, Y \wedge [\texttt{a call a}] \, Y \wedge [\texttt{a ret a}] \, Y \wedge [\texttt{a caret send}] \, \texttt{ff} \end{split}$$

- A security policy: "no send after read" Interface: provided a, required read, send Behavioural specification: φ = νX. [τ] X ∧ [a caret send] X ∧ [a call a] X ∧ [a ret a] X ∧ [a caret read] φ' φ' = νY. [τ] Y ∧ [a caret read] Y ∧ [a call a] Y ∧ [a ret a] Y ∧ [a caret send] ff
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- "a vote only is submitted after validation"
- "votes are only counted after voting has finished"
- "no non-atomic operations within transactions"

4. Maximal Flow Graphs

Given a structural property ϕ , is there a maximal flow graph for ϕ ?

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4. Maximal Flow Graphs

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The maximal model of a structural property may not be a legal flow graph!

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However, given an interface I we can *characterize* flow graphs with that interface — in structural simulation logic!

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For example, for closed interface $I = \{a, b\}$ we have:

$$\theta_I = (\nu X. \ a \wedge [a, b, \epsilon] X) \lor (\nu Y. \ b \wedge [a, b, \epsilon] Y)$$

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For example, for closed interface $I = \{a, b\}$ we have:

$$\theta_{I} = (\nu X. \ a \land [a, b, \epsilon] X) \lor (\nu Y. \ b \land [a, b, \epsilon] Y)$$

Then, the maximal flow graph for a structural formula ϕ and interface I is simply the maximal model for $\phi \land \theta_I$

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Since structural simulation is monotone w.r.t. flow graph composition, we can thus support modular verification for structural properties!

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Structural simulation entails behavioural simulation

Hence, we can even verify global behavioural properties with local structural specifications!

For instance, specify even and odd structurally, and verify the global behavioural specification:

even
$$\Rightarrow \nu X$$
. [even call even] ff $\wedge [\tau] X$

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Structural specification for even:

Interface: prov. even, req. odd

 $\begin{array}{l} \phi_{\texttt{even}} = \nu X. \hspace{0.2cm} [\texttt{even}] \hspace{0.1cm} \texttt{ff} \wedge [\texttt{odd}] \hspace{0.1cm} \phi_{\texttt{even}}' \wedge [\epsilon] \hspace{0.1cm} X \\ \phi_{\texttt{even}}' = \nu Y. \hspace{0.2cm} [\texttt{even}] \hspace{0.1cm} \texttt{ff} \wedge [\texttt{odd}] \hspace{0.1cm} \texttt{ff} \wedge [\epsilon] \hspace{0.1cm} Y \end{array}$

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
Structural specification for even: Interface: prov. even, req. odd $\phi_{\text{even}} = \nu X$. [even] ff \wedge [odd] $\phi'_{\text{even}} \wedge [\epsilon] X$

 $\phi'_{\text{even}} = \nu Y$. [even] ff \wedge [odd] ff \wedge [ϵ] Y

Structural specification for odd:

Interface: prov. odd, req. even

 $\phi_{\text{odd}} = \nu X. \text{ [odd] ff} \land \text{[even]} \phi'_{\text{odd}} \land [\epsilon] X$ $\phi'_{odd} = \nu Y. \text{ [odd] ff } \land \text{[even] ff } \land [\epsilon] Y$



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The maximal model of a behavioural property is not a legal flow graph!

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Several possibilities:

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The maximal model of a behavioural property is not a legal flow graph!

Several possibilities:

- use maximal models at the expense of completeness: false negatives
- translate behavioural properties to structural ones: expensive
- restrict behavioural logic: atomic calls only: caret

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Modular Verification of Temporal Safety Prop

15 November 2011 33 / 41

Behavioural property "no send after read":

 $\begin{array}{rcl} \phi & = & \nu X. \ [\tau] \ X \land [\texttt{a caret send}] \ X \land [\texttt{a call a}] \ X \land [\texttt{a ret a}] \ X \land [\texttt{a caret read}] \ \phi' \\ \phi' & = & \nu Y. \ [\tau] \ Y \land [\texttt{a caret read}] \ Y \land [\texttt{a call a}] \ Y \land [\texttt{a ret a}] \ Y \land [\texttt{a caret send}] \ \texttt{ff} \end{array}$

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gives rise to several structural properties, most notably:

$$\begin{array}{rcl} \psi &=& \nu X. \ [\epsilon] \, X \wedge [\texttt{send}] \, X \wedge [\texttt{a}] \, \psi' \wedge [\texttt{read}] \, \psi' \\ \psi' &=& \nu Y. \ [\epsilon] \, Y \wedge [\texttt{read}] \, Y \wedge [\texttt{a}] \, \texttt{ff} \wedge [\texttt{send}] \, \texttt{ff} \end{array}$$

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 $\begin{array}{rcl} \phi & = & \nu X. \ [\tau] \ X \wedge [\texttt{a caret send}] \ X \wedge [\texttt{a call a}] \ X \wedge [\texttt{a ret a}] \ X \wedge [\texttt{a caret read}] \ \phi' \\ \phi' & = & \nu Y. \ [\tau] \ Y \wedge [\texttt{a caret read}] \ Y \wedge [\texttt{a call a}] \ Y \wedge [\texttt{a ret a}] \ Y \wedge [\texttt{a caret send}] \ \texttt{ff} \end{array}$

gives rise to several structural properties, most notably:

$$\begin{array}{rcl} \psi &=& \nu X. \ [\epsilon] \, X \wedge [\texttt{send}] \, X \wedge [\texttt{a}] \, \psi' \wedge [\texttt{read}] \, \psi' \\ \psi' &=& \nu Y. \ [\epsilon] \, Y \wedge [\texttt{read}] \, Y \wedge [\texttt{a}] \, \texttt{ff} \wedge [\texttt{send}] \, \texttt{ff} \end{array}$$

Details in:

Reducing Behavioural to Structural Properties Dilian Gurov and Marieke Huisman In Proceedings of VMCAI'09, pp. 136–150

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Restricted Behavioural Logic: Atomic Calls

Behavioural specification of even:

$$\begin{array}{lll} \phi_{\texttt{even}} &=& \nu X. \ [\texttt{even caret even}] \, \texttt{ff} \wedge [\texttt{even caret odd}] \, \phi_{\texttt{even}}' \wedge [\tau] \, X \\ \phi_{\texttt{even}}' &=& \nu Y. \ [\texttt{even caret even}] \, \texttt{ff} \wedge [\texttt{even caret odd}] \, \texttt{ff} \wedge [\tau] \, Y \end{array}$$

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gives rise to a *single* structural property:

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
gives rise to a *single* structural property:

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obtained through a *direct* translation!

5. Tool Support

The CVPP Tool Set



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Automation

Full automation would require:

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Full automation would require:

- single input to the checker
- local and global specs as annotations/comments
- inspired from JML based verification tools like ESC/Java
- pre- and post-processing


Automation

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- single input to the checker
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- inspired from JML based verification tools like ESC/Java
- pre- and post-processing

```
/** @global LTL prop:
      even -> X ((even && !entry) W odd)
 */
public class EvenOdd {
   /** @local interface: requires {odd}
    *
     @local_SL_prop:
        nu X1. (([even call even]ff) /\ ([tau]X1) /\
          [even caret odd] nu X2.
            (([even call even]ff) /\
             ([even caret odd]ff) /\ ([tau]X2))
    *
    */
   public boolean even(int n) {
      if (n == 0) return true:
      else return odd(n-1):
   }
   /** @local interface: requires {even}
       @local SL prop:
         nu X1. (([odd call odd]ff) /\ ([tau]X1) /\
            [odd caret even] nu X2.
              (([odd call odd]ff) /\
    *
               ([odd caret even]ff) /\ ([tau]X2))
    */
   public boolean odd(int n) {
      if (n == 0) return false:
      else return even(n-1):
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}
```

$\operatorname{ProMoVer:}$ A wrapper around CVPP



Dilian Gurov (KTH)

Modular Verification of Temporal Safety Prop


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$\operatorname{ProMoVer:}$ A wrapper around CVPP




Details in:

ProMoVer: Modular Verification of Temporal Safety Properties Siavash Soleimanifard, Dilian Gurov and Marieke Huisman In Proceedings of SEFM'11, pp. 366–381

6. Application: Software Product Lines

A hierarchical variability model for software product lines:



Dilian Gurov (KTH)

Modular Verification of Temporal Safety Prop

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Software Product Lines Verification

The number of products can be exponential in the size (number of regions) of the variability model! Needs compositional treatment!

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Details in:

Compositional Algorithmic Verification of Software Product Lines Ina Schaefer, Dilian Gurov and Siavash Soleimanifard In Post-proceedings of: FMCO'10, pp. 184–203

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Dilian Gurov (KTH)

Modular Verification of Temporal Safety Prop

15 November 2011

40 / 41

Strengths:

- algorithmic verification of temporal safety properties
- modular: allows dealing with variability
- sound and complete at flow graph level
- tools and wrappers for various scenarios

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 - property translation and simplification: restrict logics

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